Editor’s note: Anthony J. Lombardi practices patent litigation and patent prosecution at Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP. He also provides counseling to clients on prelitigation strategy, portfolio development, patent monetization, and licensing activities.

A clear legal standard for determining patent-eligible subject matter remains elusive. On Friday, the Federal Circuit, in CLS Bank International v. Alice Corporation, ruled that an invention involving software for a computerized trading platform does not constitute patent‑eligible subject matter. The decision — which spanned 135 pages — by a 10-member en banc panel of the Court included seven separate opinions, but not the clarity many had hoped for.

Alice’s computerized trading platform patents were at issue in the case. Those patents describe a process for two parties to exchange obligations, such as stock trades, which are then settled by a trusted third party.

The focus of the legal proceedings was Alice’s patent claims. Positioned at the end of a patent, claims are numbered sentences that define the scope of protection afforded by the patent. Among other requirements, the subject matter of a claim must comply with section 101 of the patent laws.

Section 101 defines patent-eligible subject matter and reads: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”

Alice asserted a variety of its patent claims in the case, including claims written in method, system and computer-readable-media claim formats. However, Alice’s asserted claims generally share the same underlying premise — that of software for exchanging obligations between parties through a computerized trading platform and using a third party to handle settlement of the exchanges.

What Guidance Did the Court Provide for Software Patents?

A majority (seven of the 10 members) of the Court concluded that Alice’s method and media claims are not directed to patent-eligible subject matter. The Court split 5-5, however, on Alice’s system claims. A split means the lower district court’s ruling, which found Alice’s system claims patent-ineligible, stands. A majority (eight of the 10 members) also agreed that Alice’s method, media, and system claims should rise or fall together when determining patent eligibility.

The majority consensus ends there. A majority of the Court, however, failed to reach agreement on the reasoning behind these conclusions.

Judge Lourie, in an opinion joined by four judges (Judges Dyk, Prost, Reyna and Wallach), found all of Alice’s asserted claims drawn to patent-ineligible abstract ideas.

In his view, Alice’s method claims are directed to nothing more than the abstract idea of reducing settlement risk by effecting trades through a third-party intermediary. This, he said, is a “disembodied” concept without any real-world application. Computer-related aspects of the claims — including steps for creating records to store data, using a computer to adjust and maintain those records, and reconciling those records at the end of a trading day — in his opinion failed to add anything of substance that would save the claims.

Judge Lourie similarly grouped Alice’s media and system claims in the same boat with Alice’s method claims. He characterized the media claims — although defining physical storage media — as nothing more than the same underlying method of reducing settlement risk “in the guise of a device.”

He then questioned whether structures found in the system claims—including “a computer” and “a data storage unit” — could justify a different approach for those claims. In his opinion, they did not. He reasoned that the computer-related limitations failed to provide any “meaningful distinction” from the computer-related limitations found in the method claims.

In a separate opinion, Chief Judge Rader said he would have found the system claims patent eligible. Three judges (Judges Linn, Moore, and O’Malley) joined in that part of his opinion. In Chief Judge Rader’s view, the issue was “whether a claim includes meaningful limitations restricting it to an application, rather than merely an abstract idea.”

Applying that rationale, he reasoned that the structural limitations in Alice’s system claims (e.g. limitations drawn to “a computer” and “a data storage unit”) brought those claims into the realm of patent-eligible subject matter. However, in the remainder of his opinion (which only Judge O’Malley joined), Chief Judge Rader concluded that Alice’s method and media claims are patent-ineligible abstract ideas.

Judges Linn and O’Malley, in a separate opinion, said they would have also found Alice’s method and media claims patent-eligible for the same reasons expressed in Chief Judge Rader’s opinion regarding Alice’s system claims. Additionally, they noted that several technology companies, in amicus (friend-of-the–court) briefs, expressed concern about what they viewed as widespread proliferation and aggressive enforcement of low-quality software patents. In responding to that concern, Judges Linn and O’Malley said Congress, and not the courts, is the proper avenue for developing special rules for software patents. For example, they speculated that Congress could limit the term of software patents or devise rules for limiting their scope.

Judge Moore, in a separate opinion (in which Chief Judge Rader and Judges Linn and O’Malley joined), said she would have found the system claims drawn to patent-eligible subject matter. She also wrote that the uncertainty in court decisions over this issue is “causing a free fall in the patent system.” If all of Alice’s claims are not patent-eligible, she conjectured that “this case is the death of hundreds of thousands of patents, including all business-method, financial-system, and software patents as well as many computer implemented and telecommunications patents.”

In a separate opinion, Judge Newman shared the majority view that all of the claims stand or fall together. She would have found Alice’s system, method and media claims patent‑eligible based on the plain language of section 101.

Chief Judge Rader offered an additional opinion captioned “Additional Reflections.” There, he emphasized that the Court should focus on the language of section 101 and indicated it is unlikely that innovation is promoted by the subjective standards for evaluating patent eligibility expressed in the panel’s opinions.

What’s Next for Software Patents?

The Federal Circuit has ruled, but the dividing line between patent-eligible software and patent-ineligible abstract ideas has not come into focus. Some may say the landscape remains in a similar state as it was before the Federal Circuit’s decision: some software claims might rise to the level of patent-eligible subject matter and others may not.

The CLS Bank case is likely to undergo Supreme Court review. The Supreme Court may view the Federal Circuit’s fractured decision as an opportunity to consider software patenting again. Whether a clear dividing line will emerge remains to be seen.

Article courtesy of TechCrunch

Our education system is broken, from lower-level public schools all the way up to higher learning. EdTech startups are coming at the numerous problems from every angle. Boundless, a startup out of Boston, is aiming to offer an open alternative to the college textbook.

But major publishers like Pearson Education, Cengage Learning, and Bedford, Freeman & Worth Publishing Group aren’t so thrilled with the thousands of beta testers across 2,000 universities in the U.S. enjoying Boundless’ free and open alternatives. Students using the beta product rated the Boundless’ platform 50 percent higher than physical textbooks, and the average grade for users was a B+, with 80 percent saying they received grades they wanted or higher.

The top three publishers sued Boundless in March of 2012, but just as the company said it would, Boundless has evolved and moved out of beta with various new publicly live products. The company raised an $8 million Series A round, led by Venrock in April 2012.

Boundless has now filed an Amended Answer and Counterclaims with the court, asserting that Boundless no longer offers the products being charged with three counts of copyright infringement, one for unfair competition, and one for false advertising.

Boundless is now asking that the plaintiffs take a look at the new products and determine whether or not they also allegedly infringe. It’s unclear if this can or will affect the current court case, which is against the now-extinct beta product. In either case, the publishers seem adamant to ignore the evolution of Boundless’ products and let the ruling for the beta product determine the future of the startup.

Boundless founder and CEO Ariel Diaz tells TechCrunch that neither the beta nor the current products are infringing any copyright, since the content is sourced from publicly available information, or Open Educational Resources (OER).

In an email to the plaintiffs, Boundless’ counsel asks for more clarity about the plaintiffs’ intentions for Boundless’ current live products.

Given that there is some overlap in the content of [the beta product] and [the current products], our client is concerned that Plaintiffs will claim that Boundless’ aforementioned works infringe Plaintiffs’ textbooks only after this case ends. Our client would prefer not to conduct its business under such a cloud of uncertainty.

In other words, Boundless simply wants to know if it will be slapped with yet another lawsuit for its current products after the lawsuit on its currently unavailable beta product ends.

Here’s how the publishers’ counsel responded:

With all due respect, Plaintiffs are under no obligation to monitor and analyze those changes, factually and legally, on an ongoing basis. Plaintiffs are also not under any obligation to respond to your client’s request that they research and evaluate whether they have new claims that could potentially be added to their case at this time. It is not realistic to litigate against a moving object even if we wanted to, which we do not.

He goes on to say…

We have little doubt that the Court’s resolution of Plaintiffs’ claims will inform your client’s current and future business practices.

As it stands, 80 percent of the market is controlled by four top publishers, who all generally provide the same content in the same order. Much of that content is also readily available as OER, which Boundless takes advantage of to offer accessible course materials to students. Prices have been jacked up three times that of inflation, according to Boundless.

Article courtesy of TechCrunch

A U.S. District Court in New York dismissed a shareholder lawsuit that claimed Facebook executives including Mark Zuckerberg and COO Sheryl Sandberg didn’t disclose enough about risks to the company’s advertising business as consumers shifted to mobile devices. In a separate Facebook-related case against NASDAQ, the same judge denied a motion to move the case to a different court.

It’s a win for Facebook as the company wades through a mess of litigation following its rocky IPO. “We are pleased with the court’s ruling,” the company said in a statement.

The company’s shares have never recovered to the initial $38 price that the company sold stock at on its May 18 debut. The IPO, which raised about $16 billion for the company and early shareholders, was the most anticipated one since Google in 2004.

Because Facebook’s shares have fallen more than 25 percent since the IPO, some investors have inevitably been disappointed. In this case, they said that Facebook executives sold billions of dollars of stock in the IPO even as internal projections suggested that the company’s revenues would fall short of earlier estimates.

But the judge Robert W. Sweet said that the plaintiffs William Cole, Hal Hubuschman and Linda Levy bought their shares on the day of the IPO, well after Facebook had made several amendments to its IPO filing. Those amendments including warnings about the unproven ability of the company to make money on mobile platforms.

The plaintiffs also cited several reports in the media that Facebook had lowered guidance to analysts, who then selectively disclosed that information to investors.

In his ruling, Sweet said that even if Facebook disclosed internal projections that might have been material to the IPO, the plaintiffs hadn’t proven that it would have “significantly altered the total mix of information in the marketplace.” He also said that the timing of Zuckerberg’s decision to sell stock during the IPO wasn’t suspicious either because many executives routinely sell stock during public offerings.

Lawyers for Facebook’s executives also argued that the case didn’t belong in that court or in California court, but instead in Delaware where Facebook is incorporated.

In a separate class action lawsuit against NASDAQ for allegedly botching orders on the day of the IPO, Sweet denied a motion to remand, or move the case to another court.

The plaintiff in that case, Michael Zack, wanted the case to be heard in New York’s State Supreme Court. He had filed a case on behalf of all Facebook investors, charging NASDAQ with negligence in the design of their trading systems.

As Facebook’s opening trade was delayed, trades and order cancellations weren’t being handled normally as the auction software couldn’t keep up with last-minute order changes. Slightly after trading had started, Zack said he issued a “cancel order” around 11:30 a.m., but it wasn’t processed until an hour and a half later.

In the court’s ruling, Sweet argued that issues with NASDAQ’s trading system fall under federal, not state, jurisdiction since the system is designed in accordance with the SEC. This suit is one of 11 class action filings against NASDAQ for the Facebook IPO.

At least with the rulings that came out today, Facebook appears to be getting through all the lingering litigation following its controversial IPO.

Sweet Dismisses Shareholder Suit Over Facebook Disclosures by

Sweet Dismisses Motion to Remand Nasqaq-Facebook Class Action Suit by

Article courtesy of TechCrunch

A U.S. district judge today dismissed four cases brought against Facebook by shareholders claiming the company failed to disclose material information ahead of its initial public offering in May 2012, according to Reuters.

U.S. District Judge Robert Sweet in Manhattan said the investors did not have grounds to sue because they were not Facebook shareholders at the time the alleged wrongdoing occurred. However, a number of other claims are still being brought against the social network, and the plaintiffs could file new “derivative” versions of their cases within 20 days.

Plaintiffs claim Facebook hid facts from investors and potential investors about how its growth projections would suffer from increased mobile usage. However, Judge Sweet said the company had indeed ”repeatedly made express and extensive warnings” about mobile usage trends and potential effects on revenue growth.

In a separate ruling, Sweet decided that a proposed class action against NASDAQ OMX Group for damages related to Facebook’s IPO should stay in his court. The plaintiff had wanted the case to be returned to the New York State Supreme Court. Investors say they suffered losses because of glitches in NASDAQ’s system on the first day of Facebook trading.

That case is In re Facebook, Inc, IPO Securities and Derivative Litigation, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, MDL No. 12-2389.

Article courtesy of Inside Facebook

Editor’s note: Anthony Lombardi practices litigation and patent prosecution at Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP. He also provides strategic counseling to clients regarding pre-litigation, portfolio development, patent monetization, and licensing activities.

Software patents continue to command the spotlight. The Federal Circuit today will hold an en banc rehearing of a prior decision, CLS Bank International v. Alice Corporation, in which a three-judge panel ruled that an invention related to a computerized trading platform constituted patent-eligible subject matter. Today’s rehearing by the full Court is poised to impact software inventions and will further explore the issue of software patenting.

Patent claims define the scope of protection afforded by a patent. Only combinations of features that appear in patent claims are protected by a patent, and the claims must meet certain legal requirements. For example, patent claims cannot cover something already known or obvious variants of known subject matter. The subject matter of patent claims must also meet certain requirements specified in section 101 of the patent laws, which reads:

Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.

The question of whether software constitutes patent-eligible subject matter lies at the heart of the CLS Bank rehearing.

Set For Rehearing: CLS Bank v. Alice Corp.

In taking up CLS Bank for a rehearing by the full Court, the Federal Circuit vacated its July 9, 2012, panel decision. That decision, which reversed a lower district court, found Alice Corporation’s invention patent-eligible subject matter.

Alice Corporation’s asserted patents relate to a computerized trading platform. The platform allows two parties to exchange obligations, such as stock trades, which are then settled by a trusted third party. The trusted third party handles the settlement duties to mitigate or eliminate the risk of having only one of the parties’ obligations paid while leaving the other party with a loss. The trusted third party mitigates or eliminates this risk by being in charge and either exchanges both parties’ obligations or exchanges neither obligation.

Although Alice Corporation’s asserted claims were directed to different statutory categories (i.e. the asserted claims were written in method, system, and computer‑readable-medium claim formats), the Court viewed the claims collectively, all requiring computer implementation. Nevertheless, in the panel decision, the Court said mere implementation on a computer of an otherwise abstract idea will not render an invention patent-eligible subject matter.

The Court framed its task as deciding whether the claims captured no more than an abstract idea—that is, “nothing more than a fundamental truth or disembodied concept without any limitation tying that idea to a specific application.” The Court pointed to recent Supreme Court decisions in making this issue its focus, noting that the Supreme Court explained in its 2010 decision in Bilski v. Kappos that laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas fall outside the scope of patent-eligible subject matter. And in a more recent 2012 decision, Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., the Supreme Court explained that these exceptions are “implicit” in section 101 of the patent laws.

In analyzing whether the claims were drawn to abstract ideas, the Federal Circuit explained that the lower district court, which had found the claims patent-ineligible, had looked past claim details and viewed the claims too broadly. Instead, the lower court had improperly distilled the claims down to the fundamental concept of using an intermediary to facilitate a simultaneous exchange of obligations to minimize risk. In the Federal Circuit’s view, the computer-related aspects of the claims—including features related to electronically maintained credit and debit records—played a significant part in the performance of a specific and practical application of a business concept in a specific way. Although the use of a computer in the claims was less substantial than that of other machines in other industrial uses, the Court concluded that the specific computer-related features prevented a finding that it was “manifestly evident” that the claims were directed to patent-ineligible abstract ideas.

In a dissenting opinion, Judge Prost wrote that she would have found the asserted claims directed to patent-ineligible abstract ideas. In her view, under the Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo Collaborative Services, for a claim to constitute patent-eligible subject matter, it must include an “inventive concept.” Judge Prost criticized the majority for failing to inquire whether the asserted claims included an “inventive concept” and improperly devising a new approach to evaluate patent eligiblity, i.e. a “manifestly evident” approach.

In the CLS Bank rehearing this morning, the Federal Circuit will consider what test it should adopt to determine whether a computer-implemented invention is a patent-ineligible abstract idea. In addition, the Court will consider whether the presence of a computer in a patent claim lends patent eligibility to an otherwise patent-ineligible idea and whether it should make any difference whether a computer-implemented invention is claimed as a method, a system or a storage medium.

Potential Ramifications Of The Rehearing

The question of software patent eligibility is not new to the courts. Indeed, just weeks after the CLS Bank decision, in a unanimous panel decision on July 26, 2012, the Federal Circuit decided Bancorp Services, L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada. There it ruled that an invention related to administering and tracking the value of life-insurance policies is a patent-ineligible abstract idea. The Federal Circuit framed the test in Bancorp as whether a computer was “integral” to what the Court viewed as an otherwise patent‑ineligible process. In reaching a conclusion opposite to that of CLS Bank, the Court wrote that Bancorp’s invention used a computer only for a basic function—the performance of repetitive calculations—without imposing meaningful limits on the scope of its claims.

The CLS Bank rehearing has the potential to clarify the dividing line between software inventions that are patent-ineligible abstract ideas and those that are not. As the CLS Bank and Bancorp cases illustrate, locating that dividing line has been elusive. Although recent Federal Circuit decisions have indicated that the mere presence of a computer is not sufficient to make an abstract idea patent eligible, the degree and significance of computer involvement appears to hold some sway in deciding whether or not an idea is patent eligible. But how much and what kind of detail is required of computer‑related features to qualify software inventions as patent‑eligible subject matter remains unclear.

The test that emerges from the CLS Bank rehearing later this year may ultimately undergo Supreme Court review amid an ongoing debate over software patentability. Critics of software patents contend that too many software inventions are not new and claim simple, known ideas. According to these critics, software patents stifle innovation, cause costly litigation, and create market barriers for smaller companies unable to afford litigation. They cite these perceived consequences as reasons to restrict software patents or do away with them altogether.

Proponents of software patentability argue that the courts should apply section 101 broadly to cover modern technologies, software included. They point to the Constitution, which provides Congress with the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” Nothing in that mandate, proponents say, excludes software from inventors’ discoveries. Instead, they argue that patents prompt innovation and, without patents, companies cannot justify spending money on new products.

A ban on software patents is not the answer to improving patent quality, say proponents. They point to other provisions of the patent laws—those that exclude known and obvious technology—as the proper mechanisms for preventing patents from being granted on lackluster ideas. If an invention is not new or is an obvious variant of known technology, proponents say, then the invention is not patentable for those reasons, but the courts should not exclude software, which is increasingly important to modern life and products, from patent eligibility.

Cases such as CLS Bank present the courts with the challenge of addressing this ongoing debate while balancing, on the one hand, the prohibition against patenting ideas that are abstract and, on the other, ideas that are patent-eligible. How the courts will strike that balance for software remains unresolved.

Article courtesy of TechCrunch

Google won an important court case in Australia on Wednesday when the country’s High Court ruled that the Internet behemoth did not violate fair trade law by allowing companies to purchase AdWords containing their competitor’s names.

Five judges of Australia’s High Court ruled unanimously in favor of Google, overturning a previous ruling from the Federal Court, which had ordered the company to set up a compliance program to make sure paid ads on its search engine are not misleading. The Federal Court had found in 2012 that four advertisements were misleading and breached Australia’s Trade Practices Act 1974. Google appealed the decision, bringing the case to the High Court. The Mountain View-based company had maintained that it acts as a publisher and is not responsible for content by AdWords purchasers.

The High Court’s decisions concludes a six-year-long battle between Google and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), the country’s fair trade regulator. The ACCC brought the case against Google in 2007, alleging that the Internet giant had sold misleading advertisements allowing companies to purchase competitors’ keywords between 2005 and 2008. The case was triggered by search results in 2006 and 2007, where a search for Honda Australia would show a paid advertisement for a Honda competitor CarSales. The ACCC claimed that such ads linked CarSales to Honda Motor Co. and were therefore deceptive.

In its ruling, the High Court said Google was not responsible for the messages in sponsored links sold through its AdWords advertising platform because it had not created them.

“Ordinary and reasonable users of the Google search engine would have understood that the representations conveyed by the sponsored links were those of the advertisers, and would not have concluded that Google adopted or endorsed the representations,” the High Court said in a news release.

While significant, this case is certainly not the first time Google has been embroiled in litigation over selling AdWords ads triggered by third-party trademarks. Companies that have sued Google include American Airlines, GEICO, and the Rosetta Stone, but Google usually comes out on top in these cases, as Forbes points out.

Article courtesy of TechCrunch

The court has rejected Apple’s earlier claim that Amazon’s use of “Appstore” to describe its Android application marketplace was false “false advertising,” according to a Bloomberg news alert. Apple had filed a trademark lawsuit in 2011, stating that Amazon’s use of the term “appstore” could cause confusion among consumers. In September, 2012, Amazon asked a federal judge to dismiss Apple’s Fifth Cause of Action in the case – the aforementioned “false advertising” claim.

Apple was alleging that the use of the word “Appstore” in Amazon’s advertising is false advertising, but as Amazon explained in its filing, that word is part of the name of Amazon’s store. “It is not a statement about the nature, characteristics, or qualities of Amazon’s store, much less a false one,” the document stated. U.S. District Judge Phyllis Hamilton in Oakland, California, apparently agreed on this matter.

The false advertising claim was one of many tactics Apple was using against Amazon, but likely one of the least effective ones. By rejecting the claim, Amazon was essentially asking the court to focus on the trademark dispute, which is meant to determine if other companies have the right to use the generic term “app store.” In addition to trademark infringement and false advertising, Apple has also made other claims related to dilution and unfair competition.

This rejection only represents a partial summary judgement in the trademark case; the decision regarding trademark infringement has not yet been decided. On this front, Amazon has cited other incidences where former Apple CEO Steve Jobs and current CEO Tim Cook referred to competitors’ stores, calling them “app stores,” during press events and investor calls.

In this ruling, the document explains Amazon’s and Apple’s positions on the false advertising claim as follows:

Amazon argues that summary judgment should be granted as to this claim because Apple has not identified a single false statement that Amazon has made about the nature, characteristics, or quality of the Amazon Appstore for Android (or the Amazon Appstore, which allows viewing and downloading of apps for the Kindle Fire).

Apple essentially alleges that by using the word “Appstore” in the name of Amazon’s store, Amazon implies that its store is affiliated with or sponsored by Apple. Amazon argues that this allegation is nothing more than a garden-variety trademark infringement claim (false designation of origin).

According to the ruling, the court found “no evidence that a consumer who accesses the Amazon Appstore would expect that it would be identical to the Apple APP STORE, particularly given that the Apple APP STORE sells apps solely for Apple devices, while the Amazon Appstore sells apps solely for Android and 8 Kindle devices.”

Apple vs. Amazon Trademark Case: Case4:11-cv-01327-PJH Document102

Article courtesy of TechCrunch

Regional cell phone carriers and the Federal Communications Commission broke out the champagne yesterday as a U.S. appeals court unanimously declared that Verizon must offer “reasonable” rates to customers when they make calls outside of the network. “This unanimous decision confirms the FCC’s authority to promote broadband competition and protect broadband consumers,” exclaimed FCC Chairman, Julius Genachowski.

Smaller regional carriers, such as Metro PCS, had asked the commission to force Verizon to negotiate on how to charge users for using local networks when they travel outside of Verizon’s expansive coverage area. The Court declared that Verizon would have to either accept the FCC’s authority or (what must have been a cheeky alternative) to “not to provide mobile-Internet service.”

Verizon hasn’t yet issued a statement on the ruling, but it’s safe to bet that they won’t be ditching a major chunk of their business.

Expect the court’s decision to inflame Republicans who think the FCC has been too regulation-happy and cause greater tension over issues like Net Neutrality in the coming year

Article courtesy of TechCrunch

Facebook countersues over ‘want’ button – Facebook this week filed a countersuit against Michigan-based company CVG-SAB, which claims the social network’s unreleased “want” button is infringing on the trademark of its own button of the same name. CVG-SAB says it began marketing a want button in September 2010 to allow consumers to keep track of products and services they want around the web.

Facebook tested a want button, as well as “like” and “collect” options, in its Collections feature earlier this year. The social network also seemed to be testing a plugin that created a want button for third-party sites, but that feature was never released. CVG-SAB says there is already confusion in the marketplace. Facebook denies it is violating any of the Michigan company’s trademarks, claiming “want” is an everyday term. Facebook is asking the court to drop the suit against it and to cancel all of CVG-SAB’s trademarks and trademark applications for the want button.

Judge dismisses antitrust case against Facebook – A federal judge on Thursday dismissed an antitrust complaint against Facebook, ruling that the social network has the right to exclude users who install software to change the look of its site or swaps out its ads. A company that lets users personalize their Facebook page with custom images through an application called PageRage claimed that Facebook violated antitrust law by pressuring advertisers to stop using PageRage and locking out users until they they removed the program from their browsers. U.S. District Judge Cathy Ann Bencivengo said in her ruling:

There is no fundamental right to use Facebook; users may only obtain a Facebook account upon agreement that they will comply with Facebook’s terms, which is unquestionably permissible under the antitrust laws. It follows, therefore, that Facebook is within its rights to require that its users disable certain products before using its website.

Facebook claimant indicted for fraud, forced to pay legal fees - Paul Ceglia, the man infamous for claiming ownership of Facebook, was indicted for mail and wire fraud this week and is now being forced to pay Facebook nearly $90,000 in legal fees. Ceglia was indicted on charges that he faked evidence to support his claims that he signed a contract with Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg that gave him partial ownership rights to the company. Ceglia first brought his claims to the court in 2010.

Nokia puts Facebook buttons on new phones - Nokia this week revealed two new phone models that include physical Facebook buttons to allow users to jump straight to their social network profile. The Asha 205 and Asha 205 dual-SIM are the first Nokia phones to include the Facebook button, which first appeared on the HTC ChaCha and HTC Salsa in 2011. The Asha phones also include Qwerty keyboards and features that allow users to browse the web with minimal data.

Article courtesy of Inside Facebook

In a court filing this week spotted by Bloomberg, Apple indicated that it is “interested in resolving its dispute with Motorola completely and agrees that arbitration may be the best vehicle to resolve the parties’ dispute.” Motorola Mobility had discussed the possibility of arbitration back on November 5, when a federal judge tossed a case Apple had filed saying Motorola was abusing standards-essential patents.

Google said in a letter to Apple filed with the court that it, too would like to explore “constructive dialogue” to resolve the patent issues between the two companies in a letter dated November 13 and also filed with the court, writing on behalf of Motorola Mobility, which is now a Google subsidiary. The issues in question deal with standards patents specifically, which relate to the basic operation of smartphones, and without which neither company could likely field competitive devices. They don’t address every patent involved in the ongoing fight between Apple and Motorola – in fact, none of the patents Apple has cited in a separate complaint with the ITC are considered essential. But Apple’s wording in this filing indicates it might be interested in finding a broadly applicable licensing agreement that applies across the patent portfolio of both companies.

Much of the motivation behind Google’s acquisition of Motorola Mobility, which closed in May 2012, was thought to be due to Motorola’s ownership of many early and essential patents that could help Google fend off Apple’s attacks on Android in courts around the world. The patent theory is supported by the fact that up until now, we haven’t seen Google make much direct use of Motorola’s hardware manufacturing capabilities, since the company hasn’t yet produced any Nexus hardware and continues to operate essentially like any other Android OEM.

Apple has recently indicated a willingness to work out licensing arrangements with its patent litigation opponents, setting up a broad licensing agreement with HTC with a 10-year active window. An agreement resulting from arbitration with Motorola would indicate that rather than being an isolated case, Cupertino might indeed be growing tired of squabbling over IP with its mobile industry rivals.

Article courtesy of TechCrunch